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Abstract
The first famous t.hought experiment of Einstein gives rise to his theories of relativity. the
bedrock of modern astrophysics and cosmology. His second famous thought experiment
begin..c; the investigation iuto the foundations of quantum mechanics. It leads to a paradox.
inspiring \'arious 'no-go' theorems pro....en by Bell, Kochen. and Spe~ker. Physi~ists and
philosophers worldwide become increasingly dissatisfied with the probabilistic complemen
tarity interpretation (Born-Bohr) and eventually offer their own accounts of the theory. By
the end of the 20 th century. two alternative approaches stand out as the best candidates:
Both the hidden \'ariables int.erpretation (de Broglie-Bohm) and the many worlds interpre
tation (Everett-De\Yitt) give compelling descriptions of what the true nature of quantum
reality could be. In this paper, a chronological O\'erview of all these events is given, followed
by a philosophical analysis of the three aforementioned interpretations. Ultimately. it is con
cluded that the many worlds interpretation should be adopted as the best understanding
of the formalism of quantum mechanics and. therefore, should be used in the multiversity
textbooks.
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Introduction

The turn of the 20 th century was not- an average turn by any means. In the world of an
alytic philosophy, spearheaded by the likes of G. E. ~'Ioore. Bertrand Russell. and Ludwig
Wittgenstein. the centurial turn \\·as also a linguistic turn. In the parallel world of theo
retical physics. men such as Max Planck. 'Verner Heisenberg, and Erwin SchrOdingcr made
the quantum turn. Any good historian knows that this kind of parallelism is not merely
coincidental: \Yhen physics and philosophy both begin to radically reform their respec
tive disciplines there is definitely something in the air. It would be na'ivc here to think
t ha t physics and philosophy are fundament ally separate (their exact relationship will be
discussed in §4.3); thus, similar progressions should not be all too surprising. However, a
dynamic. two-way interplay between tbem is surely a telltale sign of not just. a Kuhnian
paradigm shift but a complete transformation of worldviews. The epitome of this kind
of convergence was the coinciding of ?"ewtonian physics with Cartesian philosophy. Isaac
Kewton showed, wit.h beautiful mathematics, that the world is mechanized and governed
by a few causal laws. Simultaneously. Rene Descartes laid down hi" mechanistic worldview
and dualism, where minds and bodies arc completely different. non-interacting substances.
This allowed for the special status that the ?"ewtonian obscn"er needed. All of a sudden,
the world was ordered and unified. The saIlle laws that gO\'erned t.he falling of apples now
applied to the heavens. and all motion was reduced to Cartesian coordinates in space and
time. But. then, two hundred years passed, and. for the most part, physics and philosophy
minded their own business, generally uninterested in the other.
1900-1913 saw the forming of \\'hat is typically called the "old quantum theory". At
this stage the theory was st.rictly phenomenological: there ""as no uuderlying formalism
bringing all the experimental results together into one framework. In 1900. ~1a." Planck
studied blackbody radiation. attempting to fix the problems associated with the ultra\'iolet
cata..<;trophf'. In 1905. Albert Einstf'in investigated the photoelectric effect. sN'ing if the en
ergy of the photoelectrons increased linearly with frequency. In 1913, ?"iels Bohr observed
the spectral lines of hydrogen. trying to understand their discrete nature. The theoretical
proposal given by all three physicists was the same: Energy is quantized (some sources say
that Boltzmann suggested this in 1877. but apparently the idea was not taken seriously
enough). This sort of idea was bizarre, but it was not unique to physics. At the same time,
the philosophy community was di~esting the idea that meaning- was quantized. Russell wa..<;
arguing that the smallest unit of meaning was the proposition (roughly. the sentence). And
so it came to be that philosophers finally sympathized with the strict reductionism inherent
to physics, so nmch that they allowed it into their own methodology and analysis. This
mirrored movcmcnt in philosophy was called logical positivism and its headquarters was
Vienna, the epicenter of 20 th century philosophical thought. The program of the Vienna
Circle. as they were called, was taken to the extreme when Russell and Alfred Xortb White
head set out on the colossal task of reducing Peano arithmetic (arithmetic of N) to logic and
a few a.xiorns of set theory. Unfortunately for Russell and his co-author, their effort.s were
proven futile when Kurt COdel published his ingenious incompleteness theorem in 193L
showin!'; that no consistent axiomatic system (that is at least. as complex as the arithmetic
of N) can prove all of its true statements. Only six years before COdel 's theorem, Heisen
berg was introducing his uncertainty principle, and with these two epistemically limitative
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result.s. the physics-philosophy reductionism spontaneously deteriorated!. Finally, in 1951
logical posit.ivism imploded when W. V. O. Quine dismantled the concepts of analytidty
and reductionism. For the first time in the history of western philosophy, a philosophical
movement. developed so much logi'cal weaponry that it was able to destroy itself. Simulta
neously, pbysics was in its own process of rebuilding as subje<::tivity quickly permeated to all
corners of the science. Thus. both in a state of shock and desperat~ for foreign aid, physics
and philosophy needed each other in order to get back 011 firm ground. This marked only
the beginning of the rejationship bet,\\"een physics and phHosophy in the 20 th century. for in
the decades to come - the dawn of the digital age - these two disciplines would slowly merge
into one intellectual endcavor in order to \1ndertake their biggest collaboration in history.
The following paper attempts to describe this intimate and highly entangled rela.tionship,
giving unyielding respect to history and the reali,ty of the slow but steady success that. has
bappened. 'Fhe immensity of manpower involved is sometimes daullttng, and although t,he
greatest. care hag been taken to give specific credit where its due, alas it is simply impossible
t.o· not omit someone here or there. There is so much literature wr,itten om. this suhject. that
organizing a century S wQrth of ideas is, in some sense, arbitTail"y. Even so much deliberation
has gone into how to organize such 1\ body of knowledge in order to somewhat do justice
to. the vastness of the field. §2 describes the concrete foundations of quantum meobanics
(bc'l"ct\fter QM): First the mathematical evol'ution of the theory is sumJJla.rized and than
the conceptual problems that immediately followed the completion of the forma1ism are
out.lined. These problems springboard into §3, which explains in detail tbe three major
interpretations of Q~1. First is the Born-Bohr probabilistic complementarity interpretation
(PCI), second is ,uIe de Broglie-Bohm hidden variables interpretation (HVli), and third is
the Everett~De\\itt many worlds interpretation ( [\VI). Bach subsection develops the key
elements of the interpretation and then goe.s into the pertinent criHcisms that. have been
made. §4 analyzes aH three interpretations philosophically and weighs them against eacb
other ano against a checklist for subscription. §4 finishes on a more abstra.c.t level! and asks
a single, but incredibly important question; What is the role of phHosophy in physics? Is it
merely to assist. in the te~ting of physical them-y against the never-ending lists of intujt1ve
metaphysical belief'S'? Or is it to help the pbysicL.'it realize the social aspects of her field
and take creative risks where TlOTml;lUy only the philosopher wouJ1d? Should we even worry
about an actual divisioll of labor be~ween physicist and philosopher? These and other
relevant questions are entertained in order to hopefully gain a wider pGFSpective on what
\ve are actually trying to do w'hen we i!lterpret not just. the data of physics, but the theories
themselves. §5 concludes the paper, acknowledglng that huge advances in t.futis Tl.'.scarch
nFC being made every year, but if we truly want a consistent. and comprehe-nsible theory of
quantum gra.,'·ity we must dig <..leeper.
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2

The Foundations of Quantwn Mechanics

The foundations of Q:\I is a broad field, requiring the minds of professional physicists,
card-carrying philosophers, and curious indi\"iduals alike. This is great in many ways, for
any project that finds itself at the interface between two spheres of thought is definitely
!1;oing to produce groundbreakin!1; ideas and new ways to approach age-old problems. At
the same time, however, there is a certain susceptibility for the..<;e ideas to copiously spread
to all forms of popular media and to be adopted by all types of peoples. There are two
main reasons why this occurs: (1) Interdisciplinary endea\-ors inevitably produce new-age,
al'a71t-garde ideas made for magazine covers and (2) t.he lack of complete aut.hority over the
ideas by a single discipline allows them to be taken less seriously, therefore allowing them
to be distributed more freely with no risk of academic backlash. This being said, it mnst
be prefaced that people academically involved in this subject. must go about their research
with a certain level of responsibility.
One example of the 'quantum hype' found in popular culture is The Tao of Physics, a
book written by the particle physicist Fritjof Capra after he used psychedelic drugs. This
book at.tempts to draw profound parallels bet""een Q~'I and eastern mysticism by abusing
and unfairly exaggerating some of the irresponsible comments t.hat. the founding fathers of
Q~I bad made after trips to China late in their lives. Again, this is treacherons territory
since many of the founding fathers made responsible use of eastern thought in thcir theories.
Bohr Vo.'as influenced b.. . eastern thought so much that he actually added the yin yang symbol
to his coat of arms whcll he was knighted in 1947. These influences can be seeo in the ideas
surrOlUlding complementarity (§3.1). Also, Bohm's concept of wholeness stems from his
experiences he had in the east (§3.2). Yet another example of hype can be seen in the film
What the Bleep Do We J(now.'? This movie essentially is a piece of propaganda created in
an effort to recruit people to the Oregon cult called Ramtha's School of Enlightenment and
it uses Q~I to explain the notion that. consciousness itself creates your world. The movie has
a ca.<;t of scientists ranging from physicists to anc,<;tbesiologists along with mystics including
Ramtha herself. Although the film does have some accurate information, it frequently
insert.:> pseudoscientific or extremely speculative theories as if they were .....idely accepted.
All in all, the foundations of Q,.\I is a very exciting and highly active area of research,
but special care must be implemented if we want to make progress, At all times we must
discriminate between 'quantum hype' and sound argumentation, although often it is quite
difficult given the bizarre behavior of the quantum \'-'orld.

2.1

Mathematical Construction

Louis de Broglie, the French Duke, initiated the mathemat.ical construction of QM. In his
1924 PhD thesis he posited the de Broglie hypothesis, no\\' referred to as wave-part.icle
duality. Combining this hypothesis with Einstein's special relativity, dc Broglie derived two
relations. The first relation, often called the de Broglie wavelength, is
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where A is wavelength. h is Planck's constant, and "'I is the Lorentz factor. The second
relation reads

E
"'1m,}
h
h
where v is the corresponding frequency of the object with the associated de Broglie wave
length. These equations are usually written, respectively, as
v=-=-

p = fl.k

(1)

E = Iiw.

(2)

In 1925. not long after de Broglie's revolutionary work, \Verner Heisenberg and, working
with him in Germany, j.Jax Born formulated matrix mcchanic$, the first complete formula
tion of Qj.f. The theory was the first to take the ahstract entities of matrices - those strange
arrays of numhers t.hat had even stranger multiplications - and adopt. them into the phys
ical world. :'\0 longer were these mathematical objects just computational tools, for now
they had physical significance. ~[atrices were chosen to represent the physical obseI"'\ables
(position, momentum. etc.) of objects specifically due to their noncommutability. Thlli is
best summarized in the canonical commutation relation

[Q,PI

= iM

(3)

where Q and P are the matrix representalions of position and momentum, respectively.
Only a year later. Erwin Schrooinger developed an entirely different formulation of QM
called wave mechanics. This formulation was based on his w;ewe equation

in.{)W =

at

[_~V'2 + Vjw
2m

=

HIf!

in which IV represents the time-dependent wavefunction. V is the potential function, and

(4)

if

is the Hamiltonian operator. Schrodinger went. on to prove the mathematical equivalence
of matrix and wave mechanics, unifying Q~[ under one formalism.
The last of the hallmark formulae of Q~l, the Heisenberg indeterminacy relation (here
aft.er 1R) was derived in 1927 by Heisenberg. In its standard position-momentum form, the
principle is

(5)
Later that same year, Paul Dirac formulated QM using operator thl'.ory and invents
the bracket notation, now the mostly widely-used Q~l notation (he also created the first
relativistic Q;"[ in 1927). Using this notation, the state vector is written as
:111) = (CO,CI,C'2, ... )T

and is called a "ket". Additionally, every kef has a "bra" in dual space and is represented
by the row vector
(lit I = (co' ci .r-i, ... )
with the coeffidents complex conjugated. In 1930, the polymath John von :"eumann ex
panded upon Dirac's work and gave Qj.I a rigorous mathematical foundation as a linear
5

algebra theory of Hermitian operators living in an abstract, infinite-dimensional Hilbert
space. Under this modern representation of QM, the eigenvalue equation becomes

and the orthonormality condition can be written as an inner product

where omn is the Kron(':Cker delta.
It is convenient now to mention that the generalized uncertainty relation can be ex
pressed as

f).Af).B

~

il

(wI[A, BH IIi)!

(6)

for it will be referred to later in the paper [91. It should be noted t.hat. the object 'sand
wiched' between the bra and the ket will, from now on, be interpreted as a general Hermitian
operator (which, of course, can be typographically expressed as a sans serif matrix, a differ
ential operator with a hat, etc., whenever a specific mechanics is used) that always acts on
the ket to its right. The Dirac notation will be universally used from this point on, unless
otherwise stated.
~Iany textbooks like to 'axiomatize' Q:\L Here, axiomatize is Ilsed in a rough sense, for
the authors of these books are Dot using the close to self-evident truths found in a formal
systcn\ of rigorous mathematics. Furthermore, it is just incorrect to speak of axiomatic
systems in physics: The fonnalism can be axiomatized, but that. does not get one to the
level of reality. the realm of interpretation. Therefore, when these authors speak of the
axioms of Q;vl t.hey really mean the axioms of the formalism of QM, but this is just a
technical note. From now on, 'a:ciomatize' will be used in the physicist's looS€ sense.
Q?o.l can be (Lxiomatized as follows:
Axiom I:
V systems 3 an infinite dimensional Hilbert Space H
whose vectors la) represent the state 3 (ala) = 1.

Axiom II:

v observables 3 A, a linear Hermitian operator, acting in 1{

3 Ala) = ala)
where la) is an eigenstate of A and a is an eigenvalue of la).

Axiom III:

a system in state In·) => P = 1(.8la)12
for the system being in state LB) where 0 ::; P ::; 1.
Axiom IV:

ih9tlw(t))

=

HllIi(t)), where H is the unitary evolution operator.
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Axiom V:

(o:lIq,plIo:) = in..
As can be SC('ll, many of the founding equations of Q),'l have honorary seats as axioms.
Axioms I and II are generally known as the correspondence axioms because they make
direct associations between the italicized 'extralogical terms' (to be discussed in §3) and
mathematical quantities. Axiom I also expresses the orthonormality condition and axiom
II uses the cigcm-cJ.lue equation. Interpetations begin to diverge when they get to axiom III,
which is sometimes called the 3..xiom of quantum statics. Importantly, it is the only axiom
which establishes a link between the mathematics and the data that relates to the physical
theory. Axiom IV is the Schrodinger equation (4), albei t in its uninterpreted, abstract
form. It is referred to as the axiom of quantum dynamics. for t is unavoidably interpreted
as time even in the most extreme intepretations. Finally, axiom V, in its deceptive brevity.
is nothing other than the canonical commutation relation (3), except that q, p, and Ii
do not have instantiated physical significance. It should be noted that the indeterminacy
relation (5) is not included in the a:uom schema, which implies that it must either be
deri"able as a t.heorem or something altogether auxiliary to the formalism. This formal
absence is the root cause of the problems now to be discussed [8].

2.2

Conceptual Problems

QM was not formally put on solid, theoretical grounds until the 19305, and it was not long
until its conceptual problems started to reveal themselves. They first manifested t.hemselves
gedankeTlf~xperimente,in which many of
the conceptual difficulties appeared irreconcilable. Decades passed until John Stuart Bell,
followed by two mathematicians Simon Kochen and Ernst Specker, produced logical proofs
that forced trade-ofl's between many of the philosophical prcfercnce~ that all physicists
carry over from the classical world. Amazingly, experimental techniques were developed
to investigate which side of the proofs Q~I actually was on. The most notable (albeit not
conclusive) experiment is the one conducted by Aspect and his team of researchers. This
will be explained in ~2.2.3.
in the form of thought experiments, or the german

2.2.1

Gedankenexperimente

The first gedankenexperiment to be discussed below was the culmination of a long scric,.'i of
proposed ideal experiments, many of which can be found in the correspondences between
Einstein and Bohr. This Einstein-Bohr debate, as its called now, will serve as a centerpic(:[~
for us and it becomes the polarized platform that gives rise to the rift in philosophical
preferellce amongst physicists of the time: Those ,,'anting a more complete theory fell
into Einstein's camp and generally subscribed to HVI (e..'Ccept, possibly, Einstein himself!)
whereas those wanting to re\-isc orthodox ideas stayed in Bohr's camp and subscribed
to PCr. In addition to this immeasurably significant dialogue, Einstein received many of
the essential ingredients of his argument from the thought experiment put forth by the
philosopher Karl Popper. Popper's experiment was later shown to be flawed. but it was a
big step towards the formulation of the EPR argument. Also, along with his foundational
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work, von Neumann offered the first 'no-go' theorem for hidden varIable theories, giving
Einstein nlUcb of ,the logic a} force that he needed in order to convey his ideas [81.

EPR Argument In 193.5, Albert Einstein, with tbe help of Boris Podolsky and Nathan
Rosen, published a paper questioning the CD1Jlpleteness of QM. Einstein's definition of com
pleteness. however. differs :from the word's more common usages seen in mathematical logic
(GOdel) and also in linear algebra regarding- the completeness of a set of eigenfunctions in
a vector space.. EinsteIn defines his completeness via a condition (Cd: "Every element of
the physical reality must have a oounterpart ill the physical theory" [6]. This kind of injec
tive mapping between ontology and theory was something Einstein firmly believed in and,
thus, he demanded it of quantum mechanics. In addition to this condition, Einstein also
proposed a condit.ion of sufficient physical reality (C2 ): "If, without jn any way disturhing
a system, we can predict with certainty (i.e., with probability equal t.o unity) the value ,of
3. physical quant.ity, then there exist.s an element. of physical reality corresponding to tbis
physical quantity". 'Ihis added condition insures that physical reality is an a posteriori
and empirical wncGpt and not something groundod in a priori assumptions. vVith these
two wndiHons in hand, it is then logically ·deduced that either (1) QM is incomplete or (2)
two physicllll quantit.ies whose operators do not commute cannot have simultaneous 'reality.
Einstein and hIs co-authors first wosidered a system composed of tv.·o particles 1 and 2,
with corresponding variables Xl and X2, that only interact, during 0 ~ t ~ T. It is also
assumed that t.he init.iall states of the iuclividual particles wGre known prior to their entan
glement. This impl'ies that the future state of the entangled system ean be determined with
the assistance of tbe SduOdinger equation (4) such that

(7)
where ua(xd is the eigenfunction of some operator correspooding to an observable. Next,
employing his preferred ",aye mechanics, Einstein supposed tba.t the waveftlQction of the
s,ystcm was of the form
1IJ(x}, X2) =

j

oo
-00

_(r)

e'

-S:~+S:Q)p

dp

(8)

with Xo being an arbitrary constant. Given this general form, equation (7) can be written
in two different but mathematicaHy equivalent ways:

(9)
or
IlI(XI,X2)

=h

J

£(x -

X2

+xo)£(x} -x)dx.

(10)

Now comparing (9) with (7). letting. y ;;;;: p, gives the eigenvalue PI = P for tile a"p eigen
function 'when acted on by the one-dimensional position-space momentum operator

p = -inS1
where, in this case, 'V = ~, .
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(11)

Likewise. the equation returns an eigenvalue of P2 = -p for the vp eigenfunction when
acted on by (11) "'ith x = X2. Thus, the system is entangled and any measurement of
momentum of either particle 1 or 2 immediately implies the \'alue of the other momentum.
Comparing (10) with (7). ktting y = x. gives the eigell\"alues Xl = X and Xl = TO + x for the
U x eigenfunction when acted on hy the position operators ij = Xl and q = X2, respectively.
Thus, as claimed by Einstein a.nd his collaborators, both ql and Pt can he obtained by
mea::iW"ing q2 and P2 [8].
Bohm. Simplification David Bohm, in his 1051 textbook QUIlnt1lm TheonJ, offered an
other version of the EPR gedankenexperiment. His version, using electron spins, was not
only a mathematical simplificatiou: but also put the core conceptual problem of entangle
ment right on the table.
Bohm considered the decay of tbe neutral pi meson into an electron and a positron:

Since the pion WN:; at rest, in order to conserve linear momentum the electron and positron
must ha\'e equal in magnitude, opposite in sign velocities. Also, the pion is a spin-O particle,
so in order to conserve angu..lar momentum the electron-positron system must be in the
singlet configuration of
(12)
Thus, if one of tbe particles is measured spin up, then the other particle is necessarily
spin down. Furthermore, Q:-'J claims that although one can never know which combination
one will get, on average one will get each pair hall the tillle. The amazing attribute of
Bohm's version is that this entanglement can exist over arbitrarily large distances: The
electron and positron can go off and a measurement can be made when they are thousands
of light years apart and still the 'umneasmed' particle will automatically choose the right
orientation. The particles cOllld even be on opposite sides of the universe (if such a phrase
can be used) and the experiment would still give the same results. Einstein eventllally
called this behavior" spooky action at a distance" because it implied that there exists a
supcrluminal influence that propagates through space instantaneously, relaying the needed
infonnation to the correlated particle. ~.-Iore so than anything, then, Einstein continued to
fight the orthodox interpretation because it directly violated special relativity [7].
Schrodinger'g Cat In response to the EPR gedankeTlexperiment, Schrooinger thollF;ht
of one of his own. Wheras Bohm's version highlighted entanglement, Schrooinger's version
highlights the mysterious act of measurement.. In one version of the SchrOdinger paradox,
a cat is put into an opaque chamber along with a vile of cyanide. There is also a Geiger
counter that has such a tiny amount of radioactive substance that probably only one atom
decays in an hour. The whole apparatus is set-up ill such a way that if the counter triggers
after an atom decays then, through a relay. a hammer is activated which smashes open the
cyanide, immediately killing the cat. If the probability of one atom decaying and one atom
not decaying are equal. then the wavefunction of the cat is
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{13}
Now the cat is in a superposition of states, neither alive nor dead Imtil observed by the
experimenter. This idea was deemed absurd to Sehrooinger: A macroscopic object like a cat
cannot sensihly be in a linear combination of states. It is only microscopic objects that can
exhibit superposition, he argued [71. This did not attack Bohr's position, though, for Bohr
would ne"er allow a classical object like a cat to be represented by a single wavcfunction.
More v,;11 be s:ud of these matters in §3. but for now we can say that the cat paradox is
mostly relevant to objective collapse interpretations.

Wigner's Friend Even more releVant to objective collapse interpretations is Eugene
Wigner's extension of Schrodinger's cat. Taking the thought experiment to its anthro
pocentric limit, Wigner took the exact same cat. scenario but replaced the cat with his
friend. This l:riend is not killed like the cat. but merely has the opportunity t() witness
whet.her au atom decays or not. The our.side observer has a dilemma: The observer cannot
decide whcther her friend collapses the wavefunction (the belief in collapse, i.e. the belief
that the wavefunctioll discontinuously attains a \'a!ue upon observation, is one of the main
topics of §3) herself or if her friend remains in a superposition. just like the cat bad, until
further inspection by the observer. \\Tigner argued that if anyone truly believed that only
the out·side observer can stop this state of suspended animation then they would be sub
scribing to solipsism. Solipsism is metaphysical idealism - where only minds exist such as
in the work of the George Berkeley - taken to the extreme. Solipsism claims that the world
is one miud and it is your mind. As empowering as it sounds, it is also logically irrefutable
and not syrnpathctic with the plurality that. physics tries tQ embrace [101.
2.2.2

Impossibility Theorems

From 1930-1950 virtually every textbook on Q\I mentioned these thought experiments in
passing. stating them Uti curiosities that would e"-entually be sorted out after redefining a
few terms here and there. However, tbese textbooks were in no way fair 'state of the union'
addresses. There was a huge drive to formulate alternative approaches to the theory and
the need for one \\'as properly prioritized. And yet most physicists were content t.o work
within the framework of the current paradigm. every once and a while Von :\eumann's 'no
go' tbeorem being brought up in com·ersation. BelL while working at CERX, became "cry
intrigued by Von .:\'clluuum's proof after it was finally translated for him by his German
colleague Franz ~Iandl. This lead to his paper on hidden variable theories (importantly.
different from hinden variable intt;rpl'etatioTl..5 - see §3.2). Soon after Bell's contribution. a
paper was published by Kochen and Specker that complemented the conelusions of Bell.

Bell's Inequality In 1964. Bell wrote a paper entitled " On The Einstcin Podolsky Rosen
Paradox" which included a simple proof [1]. Tn it Bell used a Bohm-type setup of the EPR
gedankenerperiment with a slight variat.ion. In his version the detectors used to measure the
spins of the electron and positron are not aligned in the same direction but freely rotating.
The electron detector measures the component of the electron spin in the direction of a
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Figure 1: Bell's set'up f or the EPR - Bohm 'thought experiment.
en.wikipedia.orgjwikijEPRparadox
unit vector a and the positron detector measures the component of the positron spin in the
direction of a unit vector b as shown in Figure 1 below:
Each detector measures ± ~ for spin up or spin down and a whole series of measurements
can he made. Bell tben intro~duced the expectation value (average) of the product of the
spins. This product, C, is' ulathematicaUy defined as

(14)
It is easily shown that, for arbitrary orientations of tbe detectors, the product is
li,2

C(a, b) = -4"(a. b).

(15)

Bell surmised that. there exists functions,

B(b , >.) =

Ii

±~

2'

tbat give thc result. of the electron and positron measurem.ents, respectively. Here>' repre..
sents the hidden variable or collective variables. Kext , Bell defined C again, this time as 8P
integral over a probability density;

C(a, b) =

1

p(>')A(a, ;\)B(b, >.)dA.

(16)

The rest of his p.FOof is simply ma.thematical manipulation and devoid of allY additiollal
assumptions. In fact, everything is completely generall and the only real assumption is the
existence of A and B. wbich is necessary for any t.enable hidden v~ril)ble:.c; theory. Bell
introduces anotber unit vector c and makes use of the mathematical fact that

11 P!(X)dxj

$

1

plf(x)ld,1:,

which is the origin of the inequality sign. Finally, after some subtractions and substitutions
and changing to units of fj, = 2. we have

[IIC(a, b) -

C(a, c)! $ 1 + C(b, c) II·

(17)

Eqm\t.ion (17) is Bell's famous inequality [7J. Bell's conciuRion was that (17) and the
quantum-mechanical predict.ion of equation (15) are incompatible. Therefore, if we are t.o
take QM R.<; being CDITect as fm' as it goes then there cannot be a local hidden variables
theory whatsoever. In contraposit.ion, a radical conclusion is drawn: If there is a local
hidden variables theory then Q).,[ is l1tterly wrong! To see this incompatihility we can take
the special case of all three vectors lying in a plane, with a and b perpendicular to each
other and c bisecting their right angle. Tills gives

C(a, b) = 0,

C(a,c) = C(b,c) = -

1

v'2'

which is demonstrably inconsistent with Bell's inequality;
1

J2 <i

1

1-

v'2'

Ironica.lly, Bell was the biggest proponent of the de Broglie-Bohm HVI, which is a nonlocal
bidden variables intepretaton. Bell's result. only showcd that a certain class of hidden
variable t.heories, namely the local ones were inconsistent with the predictions of Q~f. The
aiisumption of locality referred to is essentially equivalent to Einstein's cosmic speed limit
principle that grounds special relativity. Paraphrasing Einstein, locality is the idea that two
objects, separated by a vast amount in space, do not have any influence on each other. This
basic assumption allows us to approximate physical systems using quasiendosed, artificially
isolated systems, a very important theoretical technique. In its most general analysis, Bell's
theorem forces Q~I to abandon one of two fundamental aiiSllmption" found within all other
physical theories: These two assumptions are local realism and counter-factual definitene,~s,
both of which will bc explored in detail in §3. It should be mentioned that Wigner later
produced a prohahilistic form of Bell's argument, something that was even more conducive
to repeated measurements (talked ahout in ~2.2.3).

The Kochen-Specker Proof Kochen and Specker, in 1967, showed that it is, within QM,
impossible to assign definite values to every observable of a system that has noncommuting
obscrvables [8). Whereas Bell's theorem is based on an assumption of locality, the Kochen
Specker (KS) theorem is based on an assumption of nonamtexf:uality. ?'oncontextualit.y is
another taken-far-granted presupposition of physics that must be forfeited if there is going
to be any hidden variables theory that supplants Q),J. Xoncontextuality states that. if a
quantum-mechanical system possesses a value of an obsen'able then it does so independently
of any measurement context. Once again, rejecting noncontextuality is not the only opt.ion
in trying to maintain a hidden \'ariable theory. Just like Bell's theorem, there exists a
t.rade-off, this time between noncontextuality and the aforementioned \'alue definiteness.
The KS theorem is a geometrical argument that can be extended into many dimensions.
and it strictly nses the formalism of QM. It is far tuo technical for the scope of this project,
but its suhtlety cannot let us overlook its enormous significance. ~Iost of its significance
comes from closing the two main loopholes of Bell's approach: (1) The charge that Bell
assuIlles an infinite number of continuous obsen'ables is overcome because the KS theorem
uses a finite number and (2) the KS theorem applies to one-particle systems as a trivial
case a.nd. therefore. targets noncontextuality withont the added worry of nonlocality (which,
obviously. only arises conceptually when there is more than one object).
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2.2.3

Experimental Results

In 1982, Alain Aspect led an experimental physics group at the University of Paris to a
remarkable discovery [lOJ. Using the orientations of photon polarizations instead of spins,
Aspect. and his team confirmed the predictions of Q:\'1 and found Bell inequality violations.
The team used calcium cascade sources that shot out different colored phot()DS in opposite
directions. Because the angular momentum of t.he initial excited calcium atom is zero, the
final angular momentum (measured via the linear components of the photon polarizations)
would have to be zero. In the experiment, each photon arrives at different detectors -say,
ODe that measures polarizations of ~ radians from the horizontal and one that measures -i
radians -that are placed on opposite sides of the laboratory. However, there is a switch
that randomly changes the route of each photon so that they are redirected to the opposite
detector, In their third and most celebrated experiment they arran~ed the e..xpcrimcnt
so that the setting of the switch, and thus the subsequent path of each photon. can be
left unt.il just before the photon arrives at the s,,;tch, long after (relatively speaking) the
photons had b<:.~m emitted. This was extremely important because it forbid the photons
from 'comIDllniC<'lting' in any ",'ay (such as 'telling' the other phot,on how the switch was set
across the room) because no sublumillal signal could be transmitted in the remaining time
that would reach the other photon before it hit the detector. :\-Iany of the doubts about the
conclusiveness of Aspect '5 experiments have been extinguished via t.he countless additional
Bell test. experiments that have been conducted Over the past two decades by various groups
throughout the world. It is so widely agreed, now, that quantum entanglement is a real
feature of QM that it ha.<; giyell rise to a whole suhfield of physics called quantum information
theory. There is a tremendous amount of work being done in this area and its applications
to quantum computing and cryptography arc going to have revolutionary consequences 00
the future of information technology.

3

The Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics

Tbp. accompushment ofaxiomatiziog Q~l (conceptually analogous to Euclid's axiomatiza
tion of geometry) began with von Xeumann, wbo had, in effect, partially solved one of
Hilbert's 23 prohlems: Announced in 1900. the sixth Hilbert, problem was to give it rig
orous, axiomatic foundation for all known physical theories, and von :\eumann, by 1930,
had tackled the biggest beast of them all. Von Xeumann's axiom schema for Q~I qnickly
became accepted by many philosophers of science of the early 20 th century including Rudolf
Carnap and Ernest Xagel. The logical positivists (of wwch Carnap and Xagel were apart).
as a whole, believed that a physical theory is composed of three parts: The mathemat.ical
formalism F, the set of epistemic relations R (phy'sicists might call these 'rules of corre
spondence'), and the explanatory model :\'1 all fuse together to form the physical theory
Although these parts can be named separately, it does not mean it is possible to actually
filter them out. It should be uoted that the cxtralogical terms of system, state, and ob
sen'able are not defined within the synta.x of the formalism but are given semantic content
through the use of the metalanguage of R (once again analogous to t.he implicit tenns of
EuclideAn geometry sllch as point, lin~, and angle). One of the many unique aspects of Q~\'[
is that F preceded any unified interpretation of the tbeory, which was the first time this
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happened in the history of physics. Subsequent physical theories (e.g. quantum electrody
mImics) evoked ;ba.ckwards' also, but. QM remains the trendsetter. Combining F with R
leads to what is normally called a partially interpreted theory, but for the logical positi\-ists
this is a full-fledged theory and all tbat one can expect to demand from nature. However,
we are mostly concerned with the alignment of the combined F +R with M, the process of
interpretation [8).
Upon the spread of the myriad incarnations of the EPR paradox, and the subsequent
logical and e.xperimental work, the need for ·the correct' interpretation became the boly
grail. Philosophers were not shy to jump in (Popper already had) and t.he young physi
cist publishing her own fanciful reading of the QM formalism was no longer deemed career
suicide as the subtle charader of Q~I fully unveiled itself. ~Iany philosophical concepts
became the focus of debate, particularly the juxtaposed concepts of local reali.'im and coun
terfactual definiteness (the trade-offs of Bell's theorem). Also, each interpretation givp_'i
a unique account of the measurement process, which is linked with each interpretation's
own interpretation of probability (a primitive notion purposefully not defined explicitly in
the axiom scheme of Q~'l). Additional idiosyncrasies include each interpretation's view on
the indeterminacy relation and the objectivity of the wavefunction, amongst others to be
encountered. However. the two ionic columns of the scientific edifice, 7'eductionism and
determinism, came into question more so than any other philosophical beliefs. As working
definitions we can think of reduct.ionism as the proposition that the phenomenon i.s the sum
of its parts, which takes the interactions between parts as 'parts themselves' (as seen in
particle physics with force carrier bosons, for example): we can think of determinism as the
proposition that the world is causally closed, which will be clarified later. The three major
interpretations fundamentally differ in their stances on these two columns: the probabilis
tic complementarity interpretation (PCI) entirely dispenses with them. the hidden variables
interpretation (HVI) somewhat welcomes them back, and the liany worlus ioterpretation
(~[Wr) redefines them in a shocking new way. It is these fundamentally different. stances
on reductionism and determinism that distinguish these interpretations as being the most.
profounu of all interpretations yet to be expounded. By exploring these three candidates,
a exhaustive survey of the spectrum of interpretat.ion will be achieved. The minor, hybrid
approaches cannot be ignored, but that discussion win be postponed for a later paper.

3.1

Born-Bohr Probabilistic Complementarity Interpretation

The paradoxes resulting from the gedankenexperimente of Einstein, Bohm, SchrOdinger, and
\Viguer were made under the assumptions of the probabilistic complementarity interpreta
tion. PCI is still what every undergraduate student of physics is Indoctrinated with upon
his or her first Q~'[ course: It is the orthodox. conventional, standard. traditional or, most
commonly, the Copenhagen interpretation, all of these adjectives being used interchange
ably throughout most of the literature. This ambiguity of name is appropriate, however,
for the 'Copenhagen interpret.ation' itself is equally loosely packaged. Thus, it should be
clarified from the start that PCI is the constellation of interpretational ideas advocated by
Born and 13ohr. The variations of pcr are endless. from Schrooinger's objective genre to
Heisenberg's specific take (to be found in his Physics and Philosophy). Technically, though.
all interpret ations of Q~I are part of the same family, except. maybe the philosopher's fa

14

vorite. quantum logic. PCI just bas the historical 1w.."Jry of being first, but by no means
does that give it extra merit or plausibility. In actual fact. both HVI (see §3.2) and the
statistical ensemble interpretation, thc interpretation that Einstein personflll.... embraced,
began around the same time that. PCI was first being expounded by Bohr. Thus. it is
mostly a matter of reputation that PCI was the first. contestant to enter the race.
As alluded to earlier, the physical-theoretic structure of PCI is abnonnal: PCI has a
formalism F, epistemic relations R, but no explanatory model ~1. PCI took off in 1926,
with Born's probabilistic intcrpretation of the wavefunction, which is highly responsible for
the ad hoc appearance of A..xiom III. Born posited that the wavefunction contained definite
information - namely, probability densities - about the observables via the mathematical
operation of the squared modulus of a comple."\( function. This discovery led to amazingly
accurate experimental fmdings and, therefore, became the interpretational starting block
for many interpretations that followed.

3.1.1

Basic Principles

\\11ile working in conjunction with Heisenberg in Copenhagen, Bohr formed many of the
PCI concepts. including complementarity, before the EPR paper was published. Bohr's
complement-arity is frequently called w8ye-partide duality. but Bohr himself would not ap
prove of this nomenclature for it has a mystical connotation and. thus, it. will he not be
used. Also, this is the same name ascribed to the de Broglie hypothesis, whkh is not the
same as complementarity. After the EPR argument was released. complementarity was
still Bohr's weapon of choice, but his overall theory had coagulated into something much
grander. In regards to Einstein's charge of incompleteness, Bohr wrote, "The apparent
contradiction in fact discloses only an essential inadcquacy of the customar.... viewpoint of
natural philosophy for a rational account of physical phenomena of the type with which we
are conccrned in quantum mechanics" [4]. Bohr, in his article, systematically explained how
the EPR slit setup is impossihle, for there will always be a mechanical disturbance of the
system. Complementarity runs much deeper. though. for Bohr continually mentioned one's
'freedom of choice' in his paper. and how one experimental arrangement forbids complemen
tary knowledge. Thus, PCI is an epistemological theory. Bohr believed that we all possess
a certain set of a priori. pre-scientific, common categories. not dissimilar from the ,·iews
of the philosopher Immanuel Kant. This set includes the notions of change in position.
duration of time, and the concepts of cau.'ie and effect, just to name a few. These categorif's
sen-'e as the necessary template, the 'mesh' through which all humans must understand the
world. For Bohr, these Kantian categories are isomorphic to t.he classical concepts of the
~ewtonian world. and, thus, we can conveniently make use of the concepts of :'\ewtonian
physics when communicating our understanding of the physical theory.
Taking this as a foundation for all physical theories, Bohr assert.ed that Q~f ha.<; shown
us, most pointedly. that these classical concepts are not all applicable simultaneously in
the quantum realm. \\'hat. is implied from this is that all physical observables are defined
contextually, i.e. their mlue is dependent on the experimental setup. This is best. cap
tured in Bohr's words: "\Ve are just concerned with a discrimination between different
experimental procedures which a.llow of the unambiguous use of complementary classical
concepts .r, Thu.<;, complementarity requires that all observables are mutually exclusi"e,
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but per argues that taken all together they exhaust aU possible knowledge of the system.
Only in the extreme limit where the quantum of action becomes negligible can we apply
all of our classical concepts at the same time. This preceding statement represents Bohr's
c.orresporulence principle which explicitly states the limit as being the realm of cla.~sical
mechanics. ~Iathematically, this is expressed in the Q~I formalism as the limit where the
quantum numbers of a system become very large. The special feature of the measurement
process, then, is that a microscopic system, which can only be described by one set of
complementary properties, is measured by a macroscopic instrument that enables our use
of classical concepts, which, once again, are the only concepts the human brain is able to
comprehend. This idea is nco-Cartesian, for there is an inherent dualism in the idea that
there are two distinct physical realms, although they asymptotically approach each other.
Thus, the subject-object divide of Newtonian physics is artificially preserved.
3.1.2

Idiosyncratic Marks

As stated previously. each int€rpretation of QM has many idiosyncmsies which set it apart
from the other interpretations. The first idiosyncrasy, then, would be the Bell trade-off:
On \\"hat side of local realism versus counterfactual definit.eness (CFD )does PCI fall? P CI
forfeits local realism because it is nonrealistic in how unmeasured "alues are simply nonexis
tent. The position, momentum, or spin of a particle is indefinite until it becomes actualized
via the act of measurement. PCI maintains CFD, though, for the idea of 'unique histories'
remains intact. That is. if one had decided to measure the position of a particle then they
would have measured the sallie vnlue as when they actually measured the position. This
leads in to the question of what the measurement process is under PCr. Bohr believed that
measurement entails the interaction of a classical apparatus with a quantum-mechanical
system. This interaction always involves an inevitable, uncontrollable, intrinsically random
disturbance ,-ia the quantum of action. This immediately implies PCl's stance on axiom
III. In illterpreting axiom III, the Born rule is adopted, which is why the interpretation at
hand is labeled as a Born-Bohr collaboration. The Born rule is to interpret P of axiom III as
physical probability. Physical probability comes from the interpretation of probability called
frequcntism in which probability is the relative frequency that a given event tends to occur
over a large number of trials. Physical systems which are given this form of probability
must exhibit pure randomness. i.e. indeterministic behavior. Thus, from one of its first
epistemic relations, PCI is shown to be fundamentally probabilistic.
Yet another idiosyncrasy is the view of t.he indeterminacy relation (IR). In the begin
ning of the section it was noted that PCI took off with Heisenberg working under the
exasperatingly meticulous Bohr. Bohr, upon being introduced to Heisenberg's amazing
theorem, equation (5), quickly adopted it as a logically prior "uncertainty principle". It
was Bohr himself that made Heisenberg usc the word 'uncertainty', for Heisenberg usually
preferred Ungenauigkeil, the german for inexactness or imprecision, a much more epistcmi
cally neutral term [81. The indeterminacy relation is the essence of complementarity and it
demonstrates how we cannot simultaneously know the complete state of a system. Related
to the state of the system is the wa,'efunction, which, in its probability carrying nature,
represents a complete specification of the system. But that is strictly all it is; under PCI,
the wavefUIlction (or state vector) IV is only an abstract mathematical tool used for calcu
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lations. It is has no objective reality. This agnosticism allows PCI to successfully avoid the
problem of collapse, a problem that is not avoided in most other interpretations (including
its object.ive collapse variants, such as the ones proposed by von ::"eumann and Penrose).
However, avoiding; problem usually results in more problems, which is the case for PCI, an
interpretation that lacks any unified model of reality ~I.
The pillars of physics cnunble undcr PCI. PCI makes Q~l indeterministic, claiming
that the Ilniverse is fnndamcntally probabilistic:. For Einstein, the sacrificing of this pillar
was the main reason why he argued so vehemently against PCI: "I still work indefatigably
at science but I have become an evil renegade who does not wish physics to be based on
probabilities" [8). VI-hether or not PCI preserves reductionism, though, is a little less clear.
The fact that PCI does not supply a metaphysics, an :\,1, or anything beyond the thick "..ails
of positivism is the scapegoat for this ambi~';llity, What fairly can be said is that Q~I undcr
PCI is quasi-reductionisitic: It is epistemologically reductionistic, but not ontologically
reductionistk, "-e are forced to compartmentalize our thoughts when attaininR knowledge
of systems because of the inability to run single experimental procedures in order to exhaust
the epistemic content of a system. Thus, in a way, this is a forced reductionism, one in
which we can only attain fundamental tmths of systems in piecemeal fashion. However,
ontological reductionism is impossible because PCI refuses to posit anything unobservable
and, thus, there is nothing to 'cut up'. In its broadest terms, pcr declares spacetime
coordination and causality as complementary descriptions of reality, which is exactly why
it cannot be co\lched in either of these philosophical pillars,

3.2

De Broglie-Bohm Hidden Variables Interpretation

The next candidate is the hidden "ariables interpretation, HVI actually began in parallel
,,,ith PCI. starting with de Broglie's pilot wave model proposed in 1926. At the Fifth Solvay
Congress in 1927, most of world's leading physicist.s gathered to discuss the conceptual
difficulties surrounding the interpretation of their newfound theory of the mi<.Tophysical
world, Bohr discussed his complementarity and was met wit.h much acceptance, Einstein
staying somewhat quiet during the whole event. However, de Broglie got up and offered a.n
entirely different approach, which was a truncation of his ''t,heory of the double solution",
His theory gave the wavefunction a twofold role: it is a probability wave, but it is also a pilot
wave lOT/de pilote] [81, ~[ost people listened uneriticaUy, but Wolfgang Pauli was intrigued
eDough to criticize the approach to see if it could become coherent to him, As the 'story
goes, de Broglie besitated iu responding to Pauli's criticism (relat,ing to inelastic collisions),
and, thus, the theory was essentially abandoned.
That is, unt.il 1952 when Du,'id Bohm rcsurrected de Broglie's ideas, putting them to
the test.. For our purposes, then, HVI will be seen as the constellation of ideas advocated
by de Broglie and Bohm. This interpretation, as we will see, gives intuitive answers W t,he
conceptual paradoxes above and is a highly classical theory, Its physical-theoretic structure
is commonplace: it has a formalism F, a set of correspondence mles R, and an explanatory
model :\L
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3.2.1

Basic Principles

The most basic principle of HVI is the presupposition of 'hidden' variables, >.. Both Bohm
and Bell disliked the chosen word 'hidden', but it. has historically stuck so we cannot dismiss
its use; nevertheless, we can clarify what these dynamical variables are. They are either
(1) experimentally inaccc..~sibic parameters that our current technology cannot probe or (2)
fundamentally 'hidden' variables. a layer of reality that transcends our experience. It turns
out both forms work fine within an interpretation of Q:\·I, but the farmer choice should be
taken if any proponent of HVI hopes to leave room for a hidden variables theory, the kind
addressed by Bell's theorem. The difference between an interpretation of >. and a theory
of >.. is that. the former keeps the formalism F of Q:\[ invariant whereas the latter changes
F, thereby constructing an entirely new theory. Thus, we will follow Bohm's approach
and choose (1) in order to a 110\\' for the possibility of a deeper theory (although it is not
neecssary) while still maintaining an interpretation of Q~l. Since we have chosen (1), it
must be decided what parameters >. physically signify. According to Bohm, >. are the
e.""act positions of e\'ery particle in configuration spac.e at any moment in time. \Vith this
in place, the Dotion of the classical trajectory is saved for DOW every subsystem is in a
precisely defined state. But how do all of these classical intuitions infiltrate the quantum
realm? BollIn managed to do this by cle\"et1y manipulating the mathematics of QM. These
techniques were not first employed by Bohm (attempts at hydrodynamic interpretations
arrived at similar equations), but it is not an overstatement to say that he was the first to
use them coherently within a ullified interpretation.
By e..." pressing the wavefunction in polar form,
s

'1J == Re'ii'

R(f, t), S(r, t) E JR.,

the SchrOdinger equation (4) can be split into two equations relating its real and imaginary
parts. The imaginary part gives
(18)

and the real part produces

as
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(19)

Next, although S was an arbitrarily chosen variable (that was dimensionally equivalent to
angular momentum or action), three relations can be stated that reveal analogues to the
quantities of non-relativistic momentum, energy, and probability density:

'\7S == p

as

(20)

--=E

(21)

R 2 ==

(22)
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Then, the mysterious third term of equation (19) is defined to be
/j2

'V 2 R

U=-2m R'
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(23)

which BobIn ca.lls the "quantlUn potent.ial". Substituting into equations (18) ano (19) for
the cquivnlents founo in equations (20)-(22) and adopting {.he definition of (23) reveals two
very familiar equations:

ap
at

= 0

(24)

E =

E.- + [V + U].
2m

(25)

- + \l . (pv)
and

2

Equation (24) asserts the conservation of probability (specifically. its the continuity equation
for probability density) and equation (25) asserts the conservat.ion of energy (formally, its
a modified Hamilton-Jacobi equation).
It is, of course, very comfortiug to see these equations come ont of the woodwork. \"hat
is uncomfortable is the introduction of U. a grossly nonlinear potential term. This quantum
potential modifies the classical force formula, making it

F = -VV - \lU,

(26)

where the second term is the force exerted on the particles of the system by the wave. Under

Hvl, the wave is a guiding wave, the same choreographic onde pilote of de Broglie's original
model. However, it is also a 3~-dimensional field, where ~ is the number of particles in the
subsystem (thus, 3N represents the degrees of freedom). By using the equivalence (20), we
can extract the velocity equation from the gradient. of S:

v= ;m'n (w-)
~
vln

.

(27)

It is quickly seen that these \'elocities depend on the distant positions>. - the \lJ~field is a
function of the hidden variables. Thus, the intrinsic nonlocalit.y of the theory is revealed.
3.2.2

Idiosyncratic Marks

HVI lies on the same side of the Bell trade-off as PCI, but for a different reason: HVl
divorces it self from local realism because the interpretation is inherently rIonlocal. The
quantum potential is an instantaneous (superluminal) casual influence that acts on the
positions of particles via the 'Ii-field. This idea is closely linked to the measurement thp.ory
that BollIll offers (21. \Vhat a measurement eutaiJs under HVI is a violent fluctuation of
tbe 'Ii-field, e;.;pecially where R is found to be very small. It is this nltra-sensitivity that
forces us to resort to statistical description. :\onet heless, e"ery particle has definite values
of its 'observables' at all times, and, hence. realism is maintained. The real, unambiguous,
physically meaningful observables. Bohm points out. are the hidden \"ariables and velocities
of the particles. but this information is built into the w-field ano we cannot, in practice.
obtain this quantum information via our dassical measurement de\·ices. In theory. though.
we may evelltually be able to ascertain the exact values of the real ouservables. but this
presupposes significant tcchnological ad'"anccments.
In inwrprcting P of axiom III. HVI uses evidential probability which comes from the
Bayesian school of thought. This probability interpretation is different from the physical
probahility of PCI, for with c\"idential probability intrinsic randomne..~s ig not reqnireo. It
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is simply a 'degree of belief' or a 'plausibility gauge'. There is nothing fundamental about

the truth of a..'Xiom III in llVI -- it is comparable to the mean kinetic energy of an ensemble
found with the equipartition theorem of thermodynamics. Accordingly, since P has been
demoted somewhat, it logically follows that the indeterminacy [clation in HVI will have
a less profound role also. Indeed, this is the case, as Bohrn writes that HVI ~ contains
Heisenberg's relations as a limiting case. V'dlid approximately for fields averaged over a
certain lcn~l of intervals of space and time') [3]. Therefore. the IR under HVI is not an
epistemic limitation hut a practical limitation, one that ean be overcome by probing deeper
le\'els of space and time. Finally, it should be reiterated that the wavefunction of HVI is an
objecti\"e. multidimensional III-field that obeys the SchrOdinger equation.
The pillars of physics are half-way saved in HVI. The world is determinist.ic: The lIt-field
evolvc... continuously and the hidden variables A form cla.<;sical trajectories. However, this
COmes at the price of losing reductionism altogether. Q~ I under HVI is essentially ant ireduc
tionistic, or holistic as the inherellt Ilonlocality interconnects particles over vast distances.
Importantly. though. this does not destroy the apparent reductionism seen at higher levels
of obs('[\·ation, e.g. in the classical realm. Subsystems can exist in the statistical sense. and
thus the results of redlletionistic physics survive. This eerie compatibility of reductionism
and holism is embraced by many modern notions such as fractal geometries, holographic
images, and recursi\-e patterns, and thus it is slightly easier to swallow than the complete
dismantling of the deterministic picture.

3.3

Everett-DeWitt Many Worlds Interpretation

In 1957, the first American-made heavyweight interpretation W"llS proposed by Hugh Everett
III under John \'-heeler. The interpretation was a radical response to the absnrdlr magical
quality of the measurement. E\'crett's Princeton doctoral thesis was called the "relative
state formulation" and it im'olved the states of subsystems being defined relath'e to one
another. The interpretation was motivated by relativity theorists and cosmologists like
Wheelcr who were still displeased with the jarring differences between Q~I and the large
scale universe and so it seems only natural that another form of relativity be introduced.
However. even though the sequence of events in GR are relati\'e to an obsen'er, there
still remains an absolute spacetime. But what remains absolute in Q~I under Everett's
approach? It is the universal wavefu71dion of which all subsystems arc composed.
Everett's paper was largely ignored by the physic~;; community. but E\'erett was not
taking no for an answer. He decided t.o personally explain his stance to Bohr and he flew to
Europe. Bohr basically sa\\' Hugh Everett III as some enfant terrible and se\'erely criticized
bis work for taking the Q~[ formalism too literally. Everett became awfully depressed and
rcsigned to working for the defense department for the rest of his life. Decades passed
llntil his work finally began to garner some au.ention. It was Bryce De\\'itt who eventually
popularizerl Everett's interpretation under the name of t.he many worlds interpretation and
initiated thc conceptual unpacking of an otherwise dormant idea. Thus. we will refer to
~[\\'I as the constellation of ideas advocated by DeWitt and E\'erett. Its physical-theoretic
structure is atypical: it has a formalism F, an explanatory model M, but lacks episternic
relations R.
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3.3.1

Basic Principles

The main principle of ~f\'J has already been introduced; The universal wavefunction exists
for all time and governs all the dynamics of the world. An immediate consequence of this
proposition is that there cannot be an external observer of the universal wavcfunction
- there is nothing external. Implied from this fact is the renunciat.ion of any collapse
mechanism. Thus. under ~[WI wavefunction collapse is illusory, and yet it still needs to
explain how the appearance of collapse is brought about. This is where y1\\'1 usC's the
theory of decoherence. Generally speaking. dccoherence involves successive environment
system interactions that lead to stable, non-overlapping 'worlds'. In a theory of decoherence,
the environment is constantly Ulonitoring the system, performing miniature measurement
like acts which leads to the phenomenon of interference suppression. There exists a certain
preferred set of states - a basis in linear algebra terms - that the em·ironment "''ill tend to
cOllple to, thus causing suppression of interference. Microsystems that manage to decohere
have a high prohability to significantly o,ocrlap in their states, thus keeping the em'ironment
entangled. However, the key to decoherence is that as systems become sufficiently complex
the chance of this kind of perfect overlapping - every particle of a 'world' aligned with
every particle of another 'world' - is very slim. Macroscopic systems of this kind exhibit
thermodynamic irreversibility and become mut.ually unobsen·able 'worlds'. Mathematically,
the universal wavefunction. then, is e.xpressed as

(28)

where m is the total number of current branches (see equation (29) below) and n is an
arbitrary number that COUIlts the number of subsystems of each branch. Each additive
terili of this equation. then, corresponds to a separate 'world', Each world is seen as a
product of subsystems, which remain coupled until decoherence decouples the constituent
subsystems into mutually orthogonal, brand-new worlds.
For historical accuracy, it needs to be remarked that Everett. never used the terminology
of 'worlds', and that is why it has thus far been simply a quoted term, However, DeWitt's
introduction of the term is appropriate, for it is quickly realized that if the observcr is
truly coupled to the environment and part of the universal wavefunction then the record
ing de\Oices - the memories st-ored in the human brain - undergo the same splitting or
branching of worlds that everything else does. DeWitt's first. impression of this notion is
notably captured in his article on ~IWI, where he gives his personal first meeting: <II still
recall vividly the shock I experienced on first encountering this multiworld concept. The
idea of 10 100 + slightly imperfect copies of one.<.;elf all constantly splitting into further copies,
which ultimately become unrecognizable, is not easy to reconcile with common sense. Here
is schizophrenia with a vengeance" [51. III maoy ways. it is the utter bizarreness and unbe
lievable quality of this idea that helped ~1\\'I to gain such a comprehensive audience.
AE DeWitt mentions in the quote above. there is a vast number of splittings occurring
at e\'ery moment. and the total number of branches only increases with the direction of
time. ~aturally, then, the notion of entropy is used to count these branches. Specifically,
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infomlation entropy is llsed. compactly written as
n

H = - LP;lo92 P;.

(29)

;.=1

Equation (29) makes use of the nom probabilities associated with each splitting. The
idea is, instead of getting an arbitrary value that follows some probability distribution, every
possible value associated with a physical obsenrable is realized. These, then are. in a sense,
the sites of the splittings, each world branching off with a definite value. In order to account
for the truthfulness of the Born probabilities, Everett extends one of modern cosmology's
favorite ad hvc, pseudoscientific principles, the antmopic principle. In Everett's extension,
it is assumed that systems of our complexity - systems with minds - exist on a typical
branch. This leaves room for 'maverick worlels', ones in which the Born rule is \'iolated.
However, Everett proves (using decision theory) that there is a low measure (probability)
of existing in one of these worlds, and thus we can safely assume we are not in one.

3.3.2

Idiosyncratic Marks

AI; foreshadowed in §2, ~IWI forfeits counterfactual definiteness (CFD). This arise..<; beealL';e
of the non-uniqueness of histories inherent to MWI - when one hypothetically makes a
measurement every possibility is realized in a separate branch. As a result. local realism
is saved, and ~n\'! allows Qy! to be both a local theory and a realistic one. What this
means for m(~fJ.Suremcnt theory is that- there i!'l nothing at all special about the measurement
process. :\Iore precisely, the concept of measurement itself becomes ambiguous, for all
systems of sufficient complexity, be it. a geiger counter or a laptop computer, are constantly
taking 'measurements' of their coupled syst-cms. \Vhen entanglement becomes negligible
worlds split and pretty much forever remain parallel and mutually unobservable (to the
same exteot that projectile eggs that have splattered reassemble themselvl'S and jump off
the ground).
The probability interpretation of the axiom of quantum statics for ~rWl is neither that.
of relative frequencies or degrees of belief. P of axiom III is defined to be the branching
ratios of the splitting worlds. Recent work by David Deutsch and colleagues has shov'rtl that
via decision-theoret.ic and information-theoretic techniques, the Born rule directly emerges
from these rat.ios (see "Parallel Uni\'erses ~[ake Quantum Sense" New Scientist, 2007),
This not only gives the Born rule a greater theoretical indispensability, but it equates it
to a higher men.sure that exists for single trials. That is, the 'measures' of worlds arc
coefficients that deterministically evolve a." the multiworld tree grows exponentially; they
do not arise from any intrinsic randomness or notion of plausibility. This docs not affect
the role of the indeterinacy relation, which is taken as an 'uncertainty principle' just like it
is under PCI. The difference is that t.he IR in ),[WI is not a logically prior priniciple. but a
derivable theorem from the formalism of the theory. Lastly, the wavefunction is objecth'ely
real under ~I\n, and it represents the state of the entire multiworld .
.\ IWI salvages both pillars of physics. but in doing so it se\'erely redefines their meanings,
Qy[ under ),'1\"'1 can be called neo-deterministic, for e\'ery universe is causally closed yet
there is a multiplicity of noninteracting ""orlds. All of the sudden there is much more
freedom within a deterministic framework - every possibility is actualized, obeying all
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laws of physics upon its inception. Also, because locality hold~ under ~n\'L reductionism
is kept in full, the subsystem-apparatus di\'ide survi\'illg, albeit in a relativizcd form.

4

Philosophical Analysis

By definition, there are no experiments that will decide which interpretation is right or,
more precisely, closer to reality. Every interpretation attempts to fully account for all of the
predictions of Q~( and e\'ery interpretation is superimposed on the same, identical formal
ism, t he only semantic difference being that. of how the extralogical terms are interpreted.
This being the case. we are left with two philosophical tools - the use of history and
careful application of our intuitions - in order to weigh each interpretation. In applying
these tools. neutrality is necessary, for otherwise hlinding biases prevent us from seeing the
greater implications of the approaches. Ernst Mach, the fonnder of positivism who bad
a tremendous influenoe on Einstein. once proclaimed. "The philosophical poiDt of view of
the average man has a claim to the highest consideration." To take these words sincerely
we must be open minded when it comes to deciding what actually count as strengths and
weaknesses of int,erpretations of physical theories.

4.1

Comparison of Major Interpretations

In choosing our candidate interpretations, we implicitly made each one identical in its
formalism F. This is done because F is the essence of the physical theory; in other words. a
physical theory composed of just Rand M is just a collection of discrete facts that cannot
gcnerate anything novel. Conversely. a physical theory with only F is a mathematical
theory that does not attempt to map to reality - the theory is syntcDc sans semantics.
Thus, the three discussed interpretations represent the only fundamentally distinct views
of Q\I, for each one is one of the three possible combinations of R and ~L PCI only has R,
Hvl has R and ~L and ~[\\'I only has M. From this argument. alone it is shown t.hat all
other interpretations of Q\J are minor, hybrid attempts that only find originality in their
confusing conflatiol1s of the three major stances.

4.1.1

Criteria

Now that we have justified the importance of these interpretations historically and logically.
it is time to compare them side-by-side. Our intuitions point us to three established criteria,
which we can employ in a systematic comparison.
The first criterion is that of scope. How fertile is the explanatory model y(? This
question is what we mean by scope. because it is much more about the potential for growth
and incorporation into grander contexts than it is about covering all the phenomena of the
current framework. This second part is import.ant, but it was tacitly assumed that each
interpretation accounts for the same range of phenomena to begin with. The difference,
then, COllies from the language which the interpretation utilizes in order to gain insight into
broader worldviews,
The ser.ond r.ritcrion is that of economy. HO\\' efficient is the set of correspondence
rules R? In the philosophy of science. there is a certain method for navigating between the

23

observation language of a theory to the theoretica..l language of a theory.
The third criterion is elegance. Elegance is t.raditionally a hallmark of powerful mathe
matical theories, but with the ad\'ent of axiomatic s....stems of physics, it has entered into the
judgement process of the formalism of (\ physical theory. Prima facie. this criterion seems
out of place due to the fact that earlier we had said that a..Il of the interpretations were iden
tical in F. Howe\'er, it was also spoken of earlier how difficult it can be to rightly disentangle
F, R, and ~L By invoking elegance as a criterion for judgement we are firmly acknowledll;in~
the malleability of F in reaction to R and ~I. In actual fact, the corrcspond(!nce rules anri
model of a physical theory that put stress on F are usually signs of a tenable theory, or at
least oue to be seriously entertaiued. Thus, our question is this: How (potentially) compact
is the formalism F?
4.1.2

Judgement

Judging the interpretations wit.h these criteria takes further exploration of each approach.
Consequently, we will now explore deeper levels of of PCI, HVI, and MWI, viewing them
comparatively and contextually.
Scope The scope of PCI is essentially nonexistent. PCI has no unified ~ to speak of
because it refuses to posit any unobservable metaphysical entities [8]. This is ~\'Iach's posi
tivism taking to its logical apex, an ontologically vacuous theory that lead to a scient ifically
impotent. apathetically agnostic attitude that permeated throughout. the Copenhagenist
(Bohr and Heisenberg) channels. Bohr and other a.dherems made use of this fact - that
PCI is not an unambiguously defined set of ideas - and proceeded to unfairly apply its
ideas to other areas of thought. As seen in §3.1, Bohr basically was grabbing at straws when
trying to form the philosophical foundations of Q~'I-- he made significant use of two philo
sophieal beav)~-eights, Descartes and Kant, both who were responsible for reinforcing the
two pre\-ious paradigm shift physical theories of classical mechanics and relativity theory,
respectively. He was ideologically inspired by many eastern ideas, particularly the yin yang
symbol which was later put on his family coat of arms. In reading the Tao Tc Ching, Bohr
viewed the binaries of life a.'; being ubiquitous examples of complementarity pervading all
forms of human understanding. In the early 19305, physic.ists like Pa.'icual Jordan claimed
that vitalism and physicalism were complementary (\.')pects within the sphere of biology.
In t he following decades, complementarity wa.s applied to linguistics, ethics, ethnography
(by Bohr himself), and psychology 181. It was even applied to theology at one point, some
arguing that science and religion are in fact complementary to each other. The lesson to
learn here, then, is that vagueness cannot be confused as generality: PCI has no ~'I, and.
hence, is completely infertile to conforming to and incorporating frameworks beyond itself.
It. is a loose set of epistemological principles that, because they do weave themselves into
a metaphysical world view. lie at the disposal of any intellectual endeavor looking for ad
ditional justification. This should not be taken Mi a strength of a physical theory in any
way and is. ultimately, the biggest disad"-cl.ntagc of adopting per. One of the leading logical
positivists. Rudolf Carnap, eveIl said, "Description and explanation, rightly understood,
arc essential aspects of science" [8). The positivistic interpretation of Q.\l, unfortunately,
did not take these words to heart, for PCI only speaks of complementary modes of descrip
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tiOD, refraining from any explanation whatsoever. This at.titude discourages the progress of
science and should definitely be reevaluat.ed, especially in light of the implosion of logical
posi ti v15m.
On the contrary. the scope of HVI is quite expansive. HVI has a very modern M,
one that conforms well to the field-theoretic approach found in many modern-day physical
theories, from general relativity to quantum electrodynamics. The first drawback, though,
is that the field itself is an objectively real wavefunction that. exists in a higher-dimensional
configuration space. To many critics, this is very problematic. and it takes away from the
classical feel of the approach. Having 4-dimensional manifolds was tough enough t.o handle,
but how are we to digest 3::\-dimensional fields that can act on particles instantaneously'!
Proponents argue that this is just. what is needed. The biggest advantage of HVI is that it
C<'In be embedded in a larger holographic theory. Just like Bohr, Bohm was highly influenced
by eastern ideas. specifically the concept of 'undivided wholeness' found in the immanent
Tao and other eastern concepts. His attraction to this idea allowed him to work past the
nasty nonlocality and mathematically messy nonlinearity of his theory and catch a glimpse
of what he called 'a new order'. Bohm asked. "Is t.here an instrument that can help give a
certain immediate perceptual insight into what can be meant by undivided wholeness, as
the lens did for what can be meant by analysis of a system into parts?" [3]. The answer,
surprisingly. is yes. The instrument is the hologram which, unlike the simple lens that
barely preserves an isomorphism between the parts of an object and the parts of it~ image,
contains all the information of the object in a single part of its image.
The hologram has been applied to many aspects of the universe outside of Q),L For
example, it was discovered by Stephen Hawking and collaborators that the entropy of a
black hole is proportional to its surface area:
kA

5BH

= 4£2'
p

J"§

(30)

where k is Boltzmann's constant and f p =
is the Planck length (entirely defined by
fundamental constants of nature). This is merely one example of what has been called
the 'holographic principle', which hypothesizes that the information contained within any
closed volume can be encoded on the boundary of the region. The idea has even tickled the
curiosity of many cosmologists, who play with the concept that the holographic principle
may apply to the entire universe. ~Iany arguments claiming :-'I-theory - ll-dimensional
superstring theory-- - as the ultimate theory of ewrything (quantum gravity) stem from
extensive use of the holographic principle t.o account for unseen and higher dimensions of
t.he universe. Thus. HVI is extremely fertile, for it sits within a broader theory that has the
potential to connect many different areas of research into a holistic picture.
The scope of ~[\\'I is grand. Its first striking feature is that it can be applied to quantum
cosmology, t.aking the universe to be a single quantum system that e\'olves \ia the universal
wavefunction. This was a predestined outcome, of course, for Everett, being taught by the
rclat ivist \\'heeler. intentionally set out to devise an interpretation that conforms to the
needs of cosmolo~;y. The saerifice made for this ability to do quantum cosmology is the
cxtnmlgance of the many worlds themselves. Here, many critics of M\VI attack with full
force, dedaring that Occam's razor surely cuts the plurality of the many worlds. Occam's
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razor is a standard tool used to filter out unnecessarily complex theories. In essence, the
principle states that" entities should not be multiplied beyond ncceesity" [entia non sunt
mldhp/icanda. pmeter necessifatem]. Superficially, these critics sound correct, but, for a
subtle reason, they are indeed wrong. The problem lies in the equivocation of vastness
wit.h complexit.y - ),1\\'1 adds vastness but doc..~ not add complexity 15J. DeWitt's choice
of introducing the term 'world' may haye a lot do -.,rith this misunderstanding, its common
connotation inducing visions of fully concretized lands. However, if we use the term 'history'
instead of 'world' this vision seems to mostly vanish and the simplicity of ),·IWI comes to
t.he forefront.
The great strength of :\I\YJ, just like HVI, is that it is able to be embedded in a larger
theoretical framework. In the case of ).IV.rI the broader theory is the multiverse theory, pop
ularized by :\Ia.x Tegmark of :\IIT and others (see "Parallel Universes" Scier/tijic American.,
2003). In this theory there are many 'levels' of universes. In le\'el I of the multiverse, we
have the universe beyond the ohsen'able horizon, objects emitting light that will tragically
never reach our eres. In level II of the mult.iverse. we have bubbJp~~ of level I multiverses
exist.ing between vast regions of space that constantly undergo cosmological inflation. The
level III multiverse is the many worlds of :\HVI, existing 'parallel' to other level II multi
verses. Lastly, there is a level IV multiverse in wbich the laws of physics themselves are
different and give rise to different mathematical structures. This grand t.heory is extremely
powerful in that it leaves no room for theological inquiries about the special or designed
state of specific universes.
Economy The epistemic relations of PCI are not extremely economical. For example, in
conducting the single ~Iit experiment we must preemptively discard the wave picture and
observe the re.". iults via our correspondence rules that pertain to the corpuscular mode of
description. However.. in changing our apparatus to the double slit diaphragm, we must
remember to switch modes to the undulatory set. of rules and disregard any description of
particle behavior. Thus, PCI is inefficient with its R for they are all contextualized and
experiment-dependent.
Historically, a.<; Carnap points out, theoretical concepts have sen'ed effectively as um
brella terms for a vast array of observables. For instance, the concept of intensity of electric
current can be measured in a myriad of ways, and yet physicists choose to hold onto one
concept of current. This kind of injective mapping is essential for the progress of physics
and allows for conceptual flexibility. All of the most. basic theoretical concepts of physics - -
e.g. mass, space, time - can be measw'ed in a mult.itude of \\lays, creating interconnections
alld coherence within a certain physical theory (e.g. gra\'itational mass and inertial mass
in relativity). PCI takes the first steps in preventing this mapping, for it systematically
m<tps to different theoretical terms for different obsen'able terms - dots go to particles,
interference patterns go to waves, etc. Unless them is strong e\'idence for belie\'ing thilt this
trend is necessary for the futme of physics, this methodology should definitely be thrown
away.
IIVI has correspondence rules which are, in a way, estimative. The real, classical observ
abIes have been literally hidden away, pushed iuto the experimentally inaccessible scales. Iv;
a result, the 'observables' of states and expect a t.ion values are exactly \\'hat their statistical
character say. The 'systems' of HVI are ill-defined, too, so not only are the rules themselves
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estimative but also the observational terms are approximations.
The R of ~'1\,\'I is infinitely effident insofar that it is entirely absent. The downside of
this is the philosophical converse of the downside that PCI has for having no ~L Where PCI
lacks ontology, ~IWI lacks epistemology. Here it is clearly visible how reactionary ~nn is
to the positivism of PCI, but we must not be quick to count this as beneficial. Surely,
MWI avoids all the messy work that comes along with building a set of epistemic relations,
but in return it puts mathematics itself on an e\'en higher pedestal than it has ever been
before. Everett- in his paper, argued that his formulation is actually a metalheory, one
that proves tbat the Q:\I formalism can bring about. its own Interpretation, unadulterated
by human invention. This has enchanting promisc, but is it plausible? Dr subscribing
to this kind of theory-building, mathematics becomes more than a descriptive framework:
~ow, mathematics is the structure of the multiverse, a layer that we humans are lucky to
be able to tap into. Of course, mathematics as it is expressed can never be purged of its
anthropocentrism (using radix 10. for example), but its underlying fonn can be viewed (by
some realists) as e.xisting on its 0\1.'0. There have been many dreams about this reality, such
a.<; \Yigner's article YOn The Unreasonable Effecti\'eness of ~'Iathematics In The Xatural
Sciences", in which mathematics literally is the foundation of everything. If thi~ hypothesis
turns out to be true, then ~o[\\"l is the first step on our way to fully fathoming nature.
Elegance pel is not very elegant. Its F maintains all five axioms, but its conceptual
difficulties give rise to a huge temptation to add in a sixth, 'collapse axiom'. This approach,
followed by Von Xeumann and others, makes the act of measurement a fundamentally
different process than the unitary evolution of the otherwise undisturbed wavefunction [5J.
The only rea.son why PCI (and not Von Xeumann's version) 3\"oids this added axiom is
because it avoids the construction of .\f instead. By omitting ~L pel cannot comment on
the objectivity of the wavefunction and takes that as justification for pushing the collapse
problem aside. It is seen quickly, then, that when the positivistic stubbornness leaves pcr
it is forced to expand its F. not a telltale sign of a successful interpretation. ThlLS, PCI has
a maximal F. i.e. it is the least compact.
HVI is sliF;htly more flexible than PCI due to the richness of its physical-theoretic st.ruc
ture (having F, R. and ~[). Bohm explains that his approach involves three presuppositions
that make HVI a proper interpretation of Q~f and not an interpretation of a deeper theory
(i.e. Q~[ with a modified formalism). These three assumptions include (1) the Ill-field
satisfies the SchrOdinger equation, (2) the particle momentum is restricted to p = \l S, and
(3) we have a statistical ensemble of particle positions, with probability density p = 11lI1 2 .
Thus, simple modifications of these three restrictions yield inhomogeneit.ies in the field,
which would be a strong similarity to electromagnetic Held theory. Furthermore, these re
strictions will still exist as limiting cases and preserve the operational feMures of Q~f as its
used in practice. Thus, HVI stays within the fivc axiom schema and under mild manipula
tions a deeper theory may be found. It is more potentially compact than PCl, but not as
compact as ~IWI.
~[Wl has a minimal F because the a..xiom of quantum stat.ics is shown to be redundant..
It arises from purely mathematical reasoning involving decision theory as it relates to the
branchIng histories of the multiw~rsc. Proofs of the equivalence of the branching measures
with the Born probabilities are beyond the technical reach of this paper and they are still
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in their preliminary stages. Nevertheless, current work has ,indeed. established a definite
correlation betwccn the apparent. pwbabiHt.y densities of the Born rule and the measure of
each branch and t;his result ,is immensely important fot the reputation of ?o.nVI. The ability
for the ex-planatory model 1\1 of ~tW] - which, as Everett argues derived isomorpbically
from F to begi'u with - to a.ct back on the formaHsl11. sinlplifying its most ad hoc axiom
out of the schema is a token of just how intenaaHy consistent, coherent, and elegant 1-[W1
truly is.

4.2

The Role of Philosophy in Physics

Once again, it is not a coincidence of history that the fall oflogical positivism as a philosophy
was quickly followed by SOUle of tbe most ontologieally 'hea"y' interpretations physic:..'S bas
e\'er seen. Quine's Two Dogmas of Empiricism allowed the anti-metaphysical progfam to
come to a screeching halt. With Everett's dissertation five years after Quine's rcvoll!tionary
paper, metaphysics had officially' returned home to philosophy, serving as a refreshing, much
needed assistant to quantum physics. Here we reflect on the real impact of philosophy
within ihe hard science of t.he modern world. Now that physics has been revitalized, has
philosophy done its temporary job, no longer l'elevant t.o the advance of physic.s? Does
philosophy of science go baok to clarifying language puzzles buried in the cracks of the
history of science, or does it have a permaneilt task of constantly running checks and
balances on ri'-aJi interpretations of increasingly abstract physical theories? '[y hope is that
the reader sees these as· the wrong questioilS, questions that presuppose a certain division
labor between philosophers and physicists. This division, although it exist-So on universjties
campuses aU across t.he world with separated buildings, usually decorated with completely
different motifs (physics bl!1ildings resemble hospitals,,- philosophy buildings resernble the
Pa.rthenon), is ~~ntirely artificial. Both endeavors should feel fpee to invade the realm of the
other because they ape interdependent, 11lOdes of discovery., relying on ·each other for insight,
adv,ice, criticism. But the reader in replacement should he le£t wi,t.h another question: Is
there not C\ job of tne philosopher that the physicist simply wnnot do? Shockingly, the
answer is yes. Before getting into this specializf~d job, however, we will discuss a depressing
world in which physics has no philosophy. This is no hypothetical dystopia: It W3-<; the real
world of physics that existed in the past century in the interim of these all too important
interpreta.tions.
4.2.1

!Instrumentalism

There is a famous saying in physics classrooms that goes as the follmving; Shut up and
cakulate. It is ath'ibuted to David! Mennin (and sometimes Paul Dirac). This dictum
peFfectly encapsulates the lack of philosophical inquiry within the physios classroom of
even today. Yes, luckHy philosophical disconrse in physics class bas increased somewhat.
over the past. couple decades,. but that is probably only because of textbook authors feeling
pressured to do justice to histm'ical continui·ty and put in appendices mentioning minor
philosophical implications: it is probably not because professors have felt it their dilly
to raise the consciousness off their l,ypicaJlIy robot-like physics stlldents. Tbe saying is
emblematic of instrumentalism, a pragmatic approach to physics half-heartedly embraced
by the physicisfs above along with a plethora of other science educators of the 20 th century.
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An instrumentalist interpretation of QM involves the minimal interpretational machinery
needed to make useful predictions. All metaphysical and epistemological baggage is deemed
irrelevant if it attempts to do more than supply interpretation on a practical level. Under
instrumentalism, then, the idea of theories being better and better approximations of truth
i~ meaninJ;?;kss. A theory either works well in describing phenomena or it does not: it is
not more or less 'true'. This \'iew is not quite the view of relati\"ism --- where truth-values
themseh"cs are only culturally or linguistically relative - but it creates the same apathetic
attitude.
The first place philosophy should always step into, then, is a scientific drought like the
ones found during these instrumentalist times. Every professional scientist knows that spec
ulative, far-fetched, epiphanic interpretations are (normally) i.rresponsible. but this should
not hinder the working scientist from constantly trying to immerse her theory in a philo
sophical framework. The criteria llsed in our comparisons of the candidate interpretations
are admittedly mostly due to accidental trends and aesthetic appeal, and so the rational
scientist will save her time and, more times than not, choose not to spend futile efforts
participating in metaphysical hogwash. Looking at other trends, though, we can see that
our physical theories are only going to become more and more abstract. as ne..... mathe
matical technology is produced at an exponential rate. This being so, the instrumentalist
apathy that is ubiquitous in many scientific communities must dissipate quickly if we ever
want to comprehend our theories and not just write down equations. Richard Feynman
is misattributed for the aforementioned dictum because he was one of the most outspoken
ami-philosophers of his time. lIe would refer to philosophy as wordplay, utterly useless
activity that only clutters the mind. And yet., as can be discovered from any of his biogra
phies, his dasses where teeming with his philosophical positions on e\·eryt.hing from the
nature of the electron to what science is. An enigma he notoriously was, but the public
disappro\'al of philosophical work by physicists is the greatest of all contradictions.
4.2.2

The Sociology of Science

In 1996, the WU physicist Alan Sokal published a paper in the postmodernist cultural
studies journal Social Text entitled ·'Tran.-'.;gre..<;sing the Boundaries: Towards a Transfor
mative Hcmlcncutics of Quantum Gravity" Ill]. It \\'as a complete hoax, full of ridiculous
jargon and fringe theories loosely strung together by quotes and postmodernist ideas, The
decade of debate that followed was enlightening for many reasons. but most importantly
because it macle the world recognize how much of a gap exists between the natural sciences
and the social sciences. Sokal won, fair and square, and his point was well taken by many
academics on the 'cultural side' but it in no way confirmed the supposed intellectual au
thority of the natural sciences. \Yhat has fully materialized now is a new discipline - the
sociology of science. This kind of meta-science does what 'the other side' should be doing.
That is, sociologists of science treat working scientists as 'lab rats' and research them in
their natural habitat, noting their social behavior and methods of communication amongst
each other. This then, is the eternal occupation of the philosopher-outsider. if the line has
to be drawn at all. It is to keep scientists in check letting them kno\\" when new theories
are becoming unscientifically cultic (e.g. string theory) or when prominence has unjustly
overshadowed poor theorizing (Bohr wit.h PCI). Reput.ation is hugely advantageolls, even
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within the seemingly dull world of science. The was best captured in the anecdote of de
Broglie, first offering his pilot wave theory bravely in front of all the leading physicists of the
time, only to be shot down by one critic. His approach, now a mainstream and promising
area of research, .....as entirely forgotten for almost 30 years.

5

Conclusion

In conclusion, we can see that the function of the philosophy of science is multifaceted.
Also, philosophy must continually stay involved in the mathematically complicated world
of physics, clarifying concepts at all times. The philosophical project within phrsics is un
finished and will remain unfinished e\'en after we discover a theory of everything (assuming
there is one, of course).
Nonetheless, our analysis has been thorough and exhaustive, applying appropriate weight
ing coefficients to philosophical preferences and pre-established, intuiti'lie criteria. Ult i
mately. it is concluded that ~lWI should be adopted by university textbooks as the default
context in which Q~.f is meant to be first interpreted. This is not too much of a hassle, ei
ther, for the calculations of Q:\I remain unchanged under ),I\\'I -- textbooks simply have to
be expanded (and not. just gi,"en appendices that. students will never read). \Ve have shown
that ~{\n bas the widest scope of the three candidates, conducive to being incorporated
into an impressive mnltiversc theory and showing seamless compatibility with subdisciplines
such as thermodynamics and quantum information theory. It also has sprouted new sub
disciplines. most notably that of quantum cosmology, a prerequisite area of study for any
successful inquiry into the big bang and the 6rst moments of our universe(s). Additionally.
it. has an idealized economy of correspondence rules, putting the semantic pressure on the
mathematical terms themseh"es. And it is by far the most elegant of the three major inter
pretations. reducing the formalism by an axiom and accounting for it within model of the
theory.
Also. ~[WI maintains both of the philosophic pillars of physics - determinism and
reductionism both survive under :\f\\'1. This is more of a comfort than anything else, giv
ing us more room to theoreticallr breathe, so to speak. PCI loses both of the pillars and
HVI remains deterministic at the price of introducing holism, a powerful but scientifically
foreign idea (for now). ~[ost importantly, ~I\\'I is the least anthropocentric of the three
approaches. PCL in its epistemological measmement process, keeps us in a defined role as
special observers in the universe. HVI, although not discussed specifically, keeps conscious
ness in a special place, a philosophical preference of Bohm that gives humans a distinct
role in the cosmos. ~[WL though, in taking the formalism literally, takes a Copernican leap
and smears our identities across an infinitude of possible worlds. The direction of purging
physics of its anthropocentrisll1 is the path history has taken and should continue to take,
and ~IWI does well it pushing forward.
Ultimately, didactic reasons should not prevent physics students from getting an early
introduction to the philosophy of science, especially in light. of how releyant it has become.
Being aware of the history, of the conceptual transformations, of the tendency of physics
to get ahead of itself cannot be underrated. It has become commonplace now for great
physicists to proclaim during the peak of their lives that physics is 'almost over'. "·ay back
in the second half of the 19 th century, James Clerk ~'laxweIL after stunning himself with
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the elegance of his electromagnetic theory, boldly foretold that "In a few years, all ~eat
ph}'sicaI. const.ants will ha....e been approx;imately estimated, and that the only oCl';llpation
that will be left for men of science will be to carry these measurements to another place
of decimals" [81. This, of CGursc, a century and a half later, is not the case. Still. though.,
physicists have fashiona.bly made statements ~\bout the 'end of physics' more and more
frequent.!y, especial!ly in. light of the possibility of unification of Q~'[ with gravi,tation theory.
Although they are surely meant to be inspiring, they hkwe let us overlook the pbilos0phical
problems of which plague this so-called finale of the enterprise of physics. 11WI is definitely
not the end 01 the story, but it should help physics break free of the theoretical stalemate
it has undergone in the past 50 years, eventually leading t.o more profound insights and a
deeper understanding of reality.
In terms of inspiring the worK of the generation to come, there are no better words ~han
John S~.uart Bell's: 'The theoretical physicist di'tfers from the novelist in that he. beliC\'es
the story to be true" [11. It. is exactly this kind of fait..h that inspires th.e imagination and
allows the physicist to tell the greatest story of them all.

31

References
[11 J. S.

BELL, Speakable u7Id Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics (New York: Cambridge
Utliversit.y Press, 1987).

[2] DAVID Bom,,'l, Phys. Rev. 85, 166 (1952).

[3] DAVID BOAM, l-Vholeness and the Implicate Order (London: Routledge, 1980).

141 N.
[5]

BOHR, Phys. Rev. 48,696 (193.5).

BRYCE S. DEWITT, NGIlL GRAHAM, The Many- Worlds Interpretation of Quantum
·Mechanics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973).

[6] A. £Jt-JS:1EJN, B. PODOLSKY, N. RoSEN, Phys. Rev. 47, 777 (19'35).

J. GRIFFITHS,. Introduction to Quantum Mechanics (Upper Saddle River: Pren
tice Hall, Inc., 2005)

[7]

DAVI'D

[8]

iIAX JAMMER, The Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics (New York: John Wiley &
Sons, Inc., 1974).

[9] HANS C. OHANIAN, Principles of Quantum Mechanics (Upper Saddle River: Prentice

Hall, Inc., 1990).

[10] A l()Jn~W \\ f-In'i\KER, Einstein, Bohr, and the Q1)antl1m Dilemma (New York: Cam
bridge Universit:y Press, 1996).
[llJ ALAN SOKAL, Social Text 46, 217 (1996).

32

